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In the original licensing application for the prototype fast-breeder reactor, MONJU, the
event progression during an unprotected loss of flow (ULOF), which is one of the techni-
cally inconceivable events postulated beyond design basis, was evaluated. Through this
evaluation, it was confirmed that radiological consequences could be suitably limited even
if mechanical energy was released. Following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, a new nu-
clear safety regulation has become effective in Japan. The conformity of MONJU to this new
regulation should hence be investigated. The objectives of the present study are to conduct
a preliminary evaluation of ULOF for MONJU, reflecting the knowledge obtained after the
original licensing application through CABRI experiments and EAGLE projects, and to gain
the prospect of in-vessel retention for the conformity of MONJU to the new regulation. The
preliminary evaluation in the present study showed that no significant mechanical energy
release would take place, and that thermal failure of the reactor vessel could be avoided by
the stable cooling of disrupted-core materials. This result suggests that the prospect of in-
vessel retention against ULOF, which lies within the bounds of the original licensing
evaluation and conforms to the new nuclear safety regulation, will be gained.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
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the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, a new nuclear safety
regulation [2] has become effective in Japan, in which the
significant accident sequences to be evaluated for light
water reactors are prescribed. In order to investigate the
conformity of MONJU to the new regulation, the significant
accident sequences required for light water reactor should
also be evaluated for sodium-cooled fast reactors. The Japan
Atomic Energy Agency has been involved in the safety
evaluation of MONJU from the viewpoint mentioned above.
The objectives of the present study are to conduct a pre-
liminary evaluation of ULOF for MONJU, reflecting the
knowledge newly obtained after the original licensing appli-
cation, and to gain the prospect of in-vessel retention (IVR) for
the conformation of MONJU to the new regulation.
Because the Core Damage Frequency of MONJU, consid-
ering the severe-accident measures for the prevention of core
disruptions, is remarkably low (~107/reactor/y) [3], the event
progression during hypothetical core disruptive accidents
should be evaluated along the most probable scenario for
deterministic safety assessment. Although the conservative
evaluations are conducted so as to assess the effect of
phenomenological or analytical uncertainties, conservative
conditions due to such uncertainties are not superposed
because of this lower Core Damage Frequency. In the present
study, the event progression derived by ULOF is evaluated
based on the concept described above, with the knowledge
newly obtained through CABRI experiments [4,5] and EAGLE
projects [6,7], which are efficiently reflected in the evaluation
methodologies and computational analytical tools.2. Event progression in ULOF
The ULOF case will be caused by the unsuccessful operation of
reactor shutdown systems under the loss-of-flow conditionFig. 1 e Categorization of unprotected loss-of-flow (Udue to a coastdown of the primary cooling system.MONJU has
two independent shutdown systems consisting of primary
control rods and backup control rods, where the backup
control rod system is prepared as a severe-accident measure
for the prevention of core disruptions. Therefore, the core
disruption derived from ULOF means the complete failure of
redundant/diverse shutdown systems under the loss-of-flow
condition.
In the evaluation of event progressions during ULOF, the
whole sequence was categorized into the following three
phases according to the core disruption status: (1) initiating
phase, (2) transition phase, and (3) postaccident material
relocation/postaccident heat removal (PAMR/PAHR) phase.
The outline and progression of these phases are illustrated in
Fig. 1.
In the initiating phase, fuel pin disruption caused by
coolant boiling due to loss of flow would result in axial fuel
dispersion in a subassembly (SA). In the original licensing
application, the initiating phase was evaluated using the
SAS3D code [8], and the calculation result under conservative
conditions showed 380 MJ in mechanical energy.
In the transition phase, a molten-core pool would be
formed due to the failure of SA walls, and the molten fuel
would be discharged through the control rod guide tubes
(CRGTs). In a past calculation related to the licensing appli-
cation, the transition phase was evaluated using the two-
dimensional SIMMER-III code [9,10], and the calculation result
under conservative conditions artificially suppressing the
molten fuel discharge showed 150 MJ in mechanical energy.
In the PAMR/PAHR phase, molten fuels discharged through
CRGTs would be relocated toward the low-pressure plenum
(LPP) and fragmented/quenched by sodium coolant in the LPP.
The fragmented/quenched fuel particles would form a so-
called debris bed, and the decay heat generated in the debris
bed would be stably removed by natural convection or forced
convection with the restarted pony motor as an accidentLOF) sequence and outline of event progression.
Fig. 2 e Calculation geometry for SAS4A evaluation.
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PAHR phase, however, uncertainties were involved in molten
fuel fragmentation and debris bed formation, and the stable
cooling of discharged core materials were discussed
supposing the ideal debris bed condition.
Against the three phases described above, the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency has newly conducted a series of pre-
liminary evaluations reflecting the newest knowledge and
computational analytical tools. The methodology of the pre-
sent study and its results are described in the next section.3. Evaluation of event progression reflecting
newest knowledge
The evaluation methodology of the event progression for the
initiating and transition phases basically follows the calcula-
tion procedures related to the past licensing applications. In
the present evaluations, however, the computationalanalytical tools were appropriately revised, reflecting the
experimental knowledge newly obtained after the original
licensing application.
The evaluationmethodology for the PAMR/PAHR phase, on
the other hand, should be established based on theoretical
considerations, experimental database, and state-of-the-art
analyses, because the past evaluation was semiquantitatively
conducted under several assumptions regarding molten fuel
fragmentation and debris bed formation.
The methodology of the present study and its results are
described in the following subsections.3.1. Initiating phase
In the present evaluation of the initiating phase, the newest
version of the SAS4A code was applied to simulate the event
progression instead of the SAS3D code that was used in the
original licensing application of MONJU.
Fig. 3 e Transient of reactivity and power in initiating
phase under reference condition.
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initiating phase is coolant void reactivity. By contrast, fuel
Doppler, fuel axial expansion, and axial dispersion of dis-
rupted fuel driven by fission gas would provide negative
reactivity. Through the CABRI [4,5] and TREAT [11]
experimental programs, an effective experimental database
has been established for the initiating phase. Based on this
database, (i) coolant boiling, (ii) fuel axial expansion, (iii) fuel
disruption and axial dispersion in the boiling coolant-
channel region, (iv) cladding rupture in the nonboiling
coolant-channel region, and (v) FCI (fuelecoolant
interaction) void development have been well understood.
The SAS4A code [12] applied to the present evaluation for
the initiating phase, which has mechanistic models
corresponding to each of the important elements, has been
effectively validated with this database. With this
established and reliable evaluation method, the relationship
between the key design parameters and the severity of the
consequence of the initiating phase has been analyzed with
a theoretical approach [13,14].
In the present SAS4A evaluations, the calculation geome-
try, as shown in Fig. 2, was used, in which the third part of
axisymmetric core in End of High-burned Equilibrium Cycle
condition was modeled. In order to evaluate the most
probable scenario and assess the effects of uncertainties, the
following conditions were calculated:
(a) Reference condition: The void and Doppler reactivities
were set in the designed values. The fuel pin disruption
and axial fuel dispersion were simulated by the stan-
dard model predicted from the CABRI experiments.
Concerning the fuel pin disruption, in particular, the pin
failure position and the failure propagation were eval-
uated by taking into account the cladding intensity and
cavity pressure loading, contrary to the past evaluation
in which the pin failure was conservatively determined
based on the molten fuel ratio only. The negative reac-
tivity feedback due to fuel axial expansion and the fuel
dispersion driven by fission gaswere alsomost probably
simulated based on the CABRI experiments. Thus, the
reference condition was calculated under the best es-
timate assumption eliminating excessive
conservativeness.
(b) Conservative condition: In order to assess the uncer-
tainty in the void reactivity and Doppler coefficient,
these values were varied within twice the standard
deviation, which would correspond to ±20% of void
reactivity and ±14% of Doppler reactivity. The uncer-
tainty range above was estimated using the newest
nuclear design method, ADJ2000R. Other calculation
conditions were similar to the reference condition.
The transient of reactivity and normalized power in the
reference condition evaluated by SAS4A is shown in Fig. 3, in
which the contents of reactivities are displayed. As shown in
Fig. 3, the negative reactivity feedback due to fuel dispersion
should become effective prior to the prominence of void
reactivity due to coolant boiling, and should be superior to
the positive reactivity caused by cladding dispersion. Fig. 3
suggests that the prompt criticality should be avoided in theinitiating phase under the reference condition. Because the
net reactivity would reach a quasi-static state at 26.98
seconds after the onset of ULOF and the core region would
consist almost entirely of coolant void as shown in Fig. 4,
the calculation was connected to the SIMMER code at this
time, so as to evaluate the transition phase described in the
next subsection.
Concerning the conservative condition, by contrast, the
maximum values of net reactivity for various cases are dis-
played in Fig. 5, where the maximum values of net reactivity
were obtained from the reactivity transient calculations in
the same way as in the reference case. The calculation
results are summarized in Table 1, in which the maximum
power and core fuel temperature are also displayed, as well
as the maximum net reactivity. As shown in Fig. 5 and
Table 1, the prompt criticality should not take place within
any combinations of conservative void and Doppler
reactivities.
The present evaluation for the initiating phase can be
summarized as follows: (I) the uncertainties to be considered
for the initiating phase could be much reduced by introducing
the newest nuclear design methods and by applying the
newest SAS4A code in which the experimental database ob-
tained in the CABRI programs, etc., were efficiently reflected.
(II) Contrary to the past evaluation, the present SAS4A calcu-
lations showed that the reduction of excessive uncertainty
could bring the elimination of mechanical energy release
due to prompt criticality, even under the conservative
conditions.
The material distribution and core status at the end of the
initiating phase, evaluated by SAS4A under the reference
condition, would be connected to the subsequent evaluation
for the transition phase.3.2. Transition phase
In the present evaluation of the transition phase, the three-
dimensional SIMMER-IV code was applied to simulate the
event progression instead of the two-dimensional SIMMER-III
code that was used in past evaluations related to the licensing
application of MONJU.
Fig. 4 e Core status at the end of the initiating phase calculated by SAS4A under reference condition.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 2 4 0e2 5 2244The main contributor of positive reactivity feedback in the
transition phase is the molten fuel compaction in the molten
core pool that will be formed due to the failure of SA walls
after the initiating phase. By contrast, the discharge of molten
fuel through CRGTs would provide negative reactivity feed-
back. Through the EAGLE [6,7] experimental programs, an
effective database has been established for the fuel discharge
behaviors in the transition phase. Based on this database, the
following aspects have become well understood: (i) thermal
loading from disrupted core materials to CRGT structure, (ii)
failure of CRGT structure and formation of discharge path, (iii)
reasonable treatment of FCI pressure, and (iv) blockage pos-
sibility inside CRGTs. The three-dimensional SIMMER-IV codeFig. 5 e Maximum net reactivity for various void and
Doppler reactivities under conservative conditions.applied to the present evaluation, which was developed by
extending two-dimensional SIMMER-III [9,10], has been
effectively validated with this database. SIMMER-III/IV are
multivelocity field, multiphase, multicomponent, Eulerian,
fluid dynamics codes coupled with a space-dependent
neutron kinetics model. The conceptual overall framework of
SIMMER-III/IV is shown in Fig. 6. The entire code consists of
three elements: the fluid dynamics portion, the structure
(fuel pin) portion, and the neutronics portion. The fluid
dynamics portion is interfaced with the structure portion
through heat and mass transfers at structure surfaces. The
neutronics portion provides a nuclear heat source based on
the mass and energy distributions calculated by the other
portions. The experimental knowledge and physical models
obtained in the EAGLE programs were efficiently reflected
and appropriately validated in the current SIMMER-III/IV
[15,16].
In the present SIMMER-IV evaluations, the calculation ge-
ometry as shown in Fig. 7 was constructed by connecting the
material distribution and core status evaluated by SAS4A for
the initiating phase. The position of CRGTs in the horizontal
cross section could be suitably represented in the three-
dimensional SIMMER-IV, contrary to the past two-
dimensional SIMMER-III in which CRGTs were modeled in
annular shape in the core region. Thus, in two-dimensional
geometry, the radial motion of molten core materials would
be inhibited by the annular-shaped CRGTs, and nonphysical
axisymmetric/coherent fuel motion would overestimate the
fuel compaction behavior leading to mechanical energy
release. The concerns peculiar to two-dimensional geometry
cited above could be suitably mitigated by introducing three-
Table 1 e SAS4A results under various conservative conditions.
Values in upper row indicate net reactivity, in the middle row indicate maximum power (P0) and in the lower row indicate maximum core fuel
temperature (K).
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probable scenario and assess the effects of uncertainties, the
following conditions were calculated.
(a) Reference condition: The initial condition of the transi-
tion phase was connected from the SAS4A calculation
under the reference condition of the initiating phase. The
discharge behavior of molten fuel through CRGTs was
simulated by the standard model based on the EAGLE
experiments, and the penetration behavior of disrupted
fuel into the pin bundles of the lower/upper axialFig. 6 e Framework of Sblankets was also simulated using the standard model
based on some freezing experiments [17]. In addition, the
effect of FCI due to CRGT failure, whichmay enhance the
molten fuel compaction leading to recriticality and
mechanical energy release, was treated in the standard
parameters calibrated through the validation analyses
of EAGLE experiments. Thus, the reference condition
was calculated under the best estimate assumption
eliminating excessive conservativeness.
(b) Conservative condition: In order to assess the uncer-
tainty in the discharge and penetration behaviorsIMMER-III/IV code.
Fig. 7 e Calculation geometry for three-dimensional SIMMER-IV evaluation.
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were artificially suppressed. Concerning the discharge
behavior, the start of molten fuel discharge due to CRGT
failure was delayed until core pressure reached 3 MPa.
Concerning the penetration behavior, by contrast, the
penetration length was suppressed to half of the stan-
dard model by adjusting the related parameters. In
addition, the effect of FCI on the molten fuel compac-
tion was assumed to be the allowable overestimated
value by adjusting the sodium amount contributing to
FCI phenomena. Other calculation conditions were
similar to the reference condition.
The transient of reactivity and normalized power in the
reference condition evaluated by SIMMER-IV is shown in
Fig. 8, and the transient of fuel distribution in each region is
displayed in Fig. 9. As shown in Fig. 8, the reactivity would
not reach recriticality in the transition phase under thereference condition. In the early stage of the transition
phase up to about 28.0 seconds, a power transient with a
maximum reactivity of 0.94$ would be caused due to the
falling of upper dispersed fuels, which would have migrated
upward in the initiating phase. The failure of CRGT structure
and the formation of discharge path would take place by 30
seconds for all CRGTs, and the molten fuels in the core
region would be discharged through CRGTs. The fuel
discharge through CRGTs would result in a remarkable
subcritical state with about 50$ in reactivity. The fuel
inventory remaining in the core region would ultimately
(after 35 seconds) reach about 50%, and that discharged
below core bottom (including LPP), above core top, and into
core periphery (including radial blanket) would ultimately be
about 20%, 15%, and 15%, respectively.
Concerning the conservative condition, by contrast, the
transient of reactivity and normalized power are displayed in
Fig. 10, where recriticality would take place around 29.5
Fig. 8 e Transient of reactivity and power in transition
phase under reference condition.
Fig. 10 e Transient of reactivity and power in transition
phase under conservative condition.
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molten fuel through CRGTs was artificially suppressed under
the conservative condition. The mechanical energy released
by this recriticality would be about 30 MJ, as shown in
Fig. 11. Contrary to the past two-dimensional conservative
evaluation showing 150 MJ in mechanical energy, the
present evaluation under the conservative condition showed
that the released mechanical energy would be significantly
reduced because the nonphysical axisymmetric/coherent
fuel compaction peculiar to two-dimensional geometry was
appropriately mitigated.
The present evaluation for the transition phase can be
summarized as follows: (I) the three-dimensional evaluation
methodology using the SIMMER-IV code was developed and
validated, in which the experimental database obtained in the
EAGLE programwas efficiently reflected so as to appropriately
simulate the fuel discharge behavior through CRGTs and (II)
contrary to the past two-dimensional evaluation, the present
three-dimensional calculation using SIMMER-IV showed that
recriticality would not take place under the reference condi-
tion, and that the mechanical energy release under the con-
servative condition would be significantly suppressed dueFig. 9 e Transient of fuel distribution in transition phase
under reference condition.to the mitigation of nonphysical axisymmetric/coherent fuel
compactions peculiar to two-dimensional geometry.
The amount of fuel ultimately discharged from the core
region under the reference condition would be about 50% in
the present evaluation. In the subsequent evaluation of the
PAMR/PAHR phase, it was assumed that all of the discharged
fuel would be relocated into the LPP. This assumption could
envelope the uncertainties in the amount of discharged fuel
and the condition of the debris bed from the viewpoint of
stable cooling in LPP and achievement of IVR.3.3. PAMR/PAHR phase
In the past evaluation of the PAMR/PAHR phase, as shown in
Fig. 12, the discharged molten fuel through CRGTs should be
fragmented/quenched in LPP, and the decay heat generated
in the debris bed consisting of the fragmented/quenched
fuels should be stably cooled, where the coolability of debris
bed was discussed based on the Lipinski model [18]. The
past evaluation, however, involved uncertainties in the
fragmentation of molten fuels and the formation of theFig. 11 e Released mechanical energy (isentropic
expansion potential) in transition phase under
conservative condition.
Fig. 12 e Discharge of molten fuel and fragmentation in
low-pressure plenum (LPP).
Fig. 14 e Calculation geometry to evaluate velocity
distribution around low-pressure plenum (LPP) by FLUENT
code.
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phase, the coolability of discharged fuels in LPP was
demonstrated using the super-COPD code [19], FLUENT code
[20], and heat balance calculations without supposing the
fragmentation and debris bed formation.
As the uncertainties in the fragmentation of molten fuels
and the formation of the debris bed would be derived by the
coexistence of molten fuel injection and sodium vapor
development in the limited space of LPP, it was assumed in the
present study that the molten fuel discharged through CRGTs
would not be fragmented at all and would be accumulated as
an ingot in LPP. This assumption could envelope theFig. 13 e Calculation conditions to evaluateuncertainty in debris bed conditions from the viewpoint of its
coolability, because the surface area of the ingot consisting of
the discharged materials would be significantly limited
compared to the fragmented particles. Based on the as-
sumptions above, the coolability of discharged fuel through
CRGTs was evaluated using the following procedure. (i) Eval-
uation of sodium flow rate by super-COPD: Reflecting the
blockage condition around the core region at the end of the
transition phase, the sodium flow rate in LPP was evaluated
with super-COPD code under the condition illustrated in
Fig. 13. (ii) Evaluation of velocity distribution in LPP by FLUENT:
Reflecting the sodium flow rate evaluated by super-COPD, the
velocity distribution around LPP was simulated by FLUENT
code using the calculation geometry as shown in Fig. 14. (iii)sodium flow rate by super-COPD code.
Fig. 15 e Calculation model to evaluate coolability in low-pressure plenum (LPP).
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Reflecting the velocity distribution around LPP evaluated by
FLUENT, the coolability of discharged fuel in LPP was
estimated using heat balance calculations with a geometric
model as shown in Fig. 15.
The sodium flow rate, evaluated by super-COPD under the
condition shown in Fig. 13, is displayed in Fig. 16. Considering
the blockage condition around the core region, the sodium
flow rate in LPP would be equivalent to that in the radial
blanket region of 76 kg/s shown in Fig. 16.
The velocity distribution around LPP, evaluated by FLUENT
using the calculation geometry shown in Fig. 14, is displayed
in Fig. 17. The coolant velocity at the upper surface of
discharged materials in LPP and that at the lower surface of
the core catcher, which would have the greatest effect on
the coolability of discharged materials, would be u1 ¼ 18 cm/
s and u2 ¼ 0.4 cm/s, respectively.
The coolability of discharged fuel in LPP, estimated by the
heat balance calculations using the geometricmodel in Fig. 15,
is summarized in Fig. 18, in which the evaluation results of
several conservative cases for assessing the sensitivity of u1
and u2 are also displayed. As shown in Fig. 18, the case using
the evaluated velocities (Case 1; u1 ¼ 18 cm/s and
u2 ¼ 0.4 cm/s) suggests that the decay heat generated byFig. 16 e Sodium flow rate evaluated by super-COPD.discharged fuel could be stably cooled in LPP. In the case
with half of u1 (Case 4; u1 ¼ 9 cm/s and u2 ¼ 0.4 cm/s) or half
of u2 (Case 2; u1 ¼ 18 cm/s and u2 ¼ 0.2 cm/s), the decay heat
could also be successfully removed in LPP. In the case using
half of u1 and half of u2 (Case 5; u1 ¼ 9 cm/s and u2 ¼ 0.2 cm/
s), partial failure of the LPP structure might take place, but
the discharged fuels could be cooled/retained on the core
catcher, where the integrity/failure of the LPP structure was
determined based on a structure intensity model, as shown
in Fig. 19, in which the effect of gravitational/thermal load
on the creep rupture are suitably considered. Therefore, theFig. 17 e Sodium velocity around low-pressure plenum
(LPP) evaluated by FLUENT.
Fig. 18 e Coolability of discharged core materials in low-
pressure plenum (LPP) evaluated by heat balance
calculations.
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by decay heat removal under the condition of the evaluated
velocities without assuming molten fuel fragmentation.
The present evaluation for the PAMR/PAHR phase can be
summarized as follows: (I) the decay heat removal of dis-
charged fuel through CRGTs was evaluated without assumingFig. 19 e Structure intensity model for creepthe molten fuel fragmentation and debris bed formation in
LPP and (II) contrary to the past evaluation involving un-
certainties in molten fuel fragmentation and debris bed for-
mation, the present evaluation showed that stable cooling of
discharged core materials could be achieved even if frag-
mentation was incomplete.4. Discussion for the prospect of IVR
Based on the present and related past evaluations, the whole
spectrum of event progressions initiated by ULOF can be dis-
played in the event tree as shown in Fig. 20. The
straightforward sequence (1) in this event tree, without any
branching to lower level sequences, corresponds to the
event progression evaluated under the reference conditions
in the present study.
Because the mechanical energy release due to prompt
criticality in the initiating phase should not take place even
under the conservative conditions as described in the section
“Initiating phase,” the deviation at the branch heading should
not be expressed here.
For the transition phase, by contrast, the deviation caused
by the recriticality should be expressed because it would take
place under the conservative condition as discussed in the
section “Transition phase.” Contrary to the past two-dimen-
sional evaluation showing 150 MJ in mechanical energy under
the conservative conditions, the present conservativerupture of low-pressure plenum (LPP).
Fig. 20 e Event tree for unprotected loss-of-flow ULOF) sequences.
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of core materials, showed that the released mechanical en-
ergy would be significantly reduced to about 30 MJ. Because
the postdisassembly expansion analysesdeven assuming the
150 MJ in mechanical energy releasedsuggests that no im-
pulse/impact pressure and no leakage of sodium from the
primary coolant boundary would take place, the IVR
expressed by sequence (7) in Fig. 20 could also be achieved in
the present evaluation.
Concerning the PAMR/PAHR phase, the blockage and
fragmentation of discharged core materials are not assumed
in the present study, which should be rather conservative
assumptions from the viewpoint of stable cooling in LPP. As
discussed in the section “PAMR/PAHR phase” for Fig. 18, the
excessively conservative condition, with a coolant velocity at
1 order of magnitude smaller than the evaluated velocity,
would result in the failure of the core catcher. The
possibility of sequence (3), therefore, is significantly low, and
its contribution to the risk of IVR failure would also be
negligible. In the related past evaluations under
comparatively optimistic conditions, in which the blockage
and fragmentation of discharged core materials are
assumed, the IVR could also be achieved as shown in
sequences (4), (5), and (6) in the event tree.
In order to further consolidate the prospect of IVR, the
authors have investigated the coolability of the remaining
core materials in the disrupted core region based on the
theoretical considerations and numerical evaluations using
computational codes such as SIMMER [9,10], FLUENT [20], and
ASFRE [21]. A clear vision for the stable cooling of the
remaining core materials has been obtained. The present
and related evaluations suggest that, in MONJU, IVR could be
achieved with an extremely high possibility even if the
hypothetical core disruptions are assumed.5. Conclusions
A preliminary evaluation of ULOF for the prototype fast-
breeder reactor, MONJU, was conducted reflecting the
knowledge newly obtained after the original licensingapplication. The present study showed that no significant
mechanical energy releasewould take place, and that thermal
failure of the reactor vessel could be avoided by the stable
cooling of disrupted core materials. This result suggests that
the prospect of IVR against ULOF, which lies within the
bounds of the original licensing evaluation and conforms to
the new nuclear safety regulation, will be gained.
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